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THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEISM: SCORING THE 
QUINN-PLANTINGA DEBATE 
William Hasker 
In the extensive literature that has accumulated around Reformed epistemolo-
gy, some of the most interesting material is found in the debate on the founda-
tions of theism between Philip Quinn and Alvin Plantinga. This essay assesses 
that debate and draws some tentative conclusions. 
In the extensive literature that has accumulated around Reformed episte-
mology, some of the most interesting material is found in the debate on the 
foundations of theism between Philip Quinn and Alvin Plantinga. The 
debate began with a 1985 paper by Quinn entitled "In Search of the 
Foundations of Theism,"l in which he raised critical questions about 
Plantinga's work on that topic. The next year Plantinga responded with 
"The Foundations of Theism: A Reply."2 After a hiatus, Quinn again took 
up the debate in 1993 with "The Foundations of Theism Again: A 
Rejoinder to Plantinga.'" So far, there has been no further reply from 
Plantinga. Nevertheless, the discussion provides a rich source of insight 
into the issues surrounding Reformed epistemology, and I believe it is pos-
sible to push the discussion some distance beyond the point reached so far 
by Quinn and Plantinga. In this paper, I will organize my comments 
around the four points singled out for discussion by Quinn in his rejoinder. 
1. Criteria for Properly Basic Beliefs 
Plantinga, himself a foundationalist in epistemology, rejects the criteria 
for "properly basic beliefs" established by classical foundationalism. He 
proposes, following Roderick Chisholm, that the right way to arrive at 
such epistemic criteria is through an inductive procedure. This procedure 
is described as follows: 
We must assemble examples of beliefs and conditions such that the 
former are obviously properly basic in the latter, and examples of 
beliefs and conditions such that the former are obviously not properly 
basic in the latter. We must then frame hypotheses as to the neces-
sary and sufficient conditions of proper basicality and test these 
hypotheses by reference to those examples.4 
One further point is worthy of note: Our initial data set consists of pairs of 
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beliefs and conditions such that (in our view) the belief in question either 
obviously is, or obviously is not, properly basic under the stated condi-
tions. But it can happen that, upon further consideration, we decide to 
eliminate some of the data from the original set, should that set prove 
inconsistent or in some other way incoherent.5 The whole procedure is not 
dissimilar to the scientific project of framing hypotheses to account for sets 
of data. (And in science also, some of the data which is initially accepted 
may eventually be thrown out.) 
Quinn acknowledges this as in principle a feasible procedure for arriv-
ing at epistemic criteria. He points out, however, that insofar as various 
enquirers may differ in their initial data sets, they may very well come up 
with widely differing criteria of proper basicality: 
The difficulty is, of course, that this is a game any number can play. 
Followers of Muhammed, followers of Buddha, and even followers 
of the Reverend Moon can join in the fun. Even the modern found a-
tionalist can play (Search, p. 473). 
Plantinga, however, does not see this as a serious objection. In a pas-
sage that is cited by Quinn just prior to the previous quotation, Plantinga 
writes: 
The Christian will of course suppose that belief in God is entirely 
proper and rational; if he doesn't accept this belief on the basis of 
other propositions, he will conclude that it is basic for him and quite 
properly so. Followers of Bertrand Russell and Madelyn Murray 
O'Hare (sic) may disagree, but how is that relevant? Must my crite-
ria, or those of the Christian community, conform to their examples? 
Surely not. The Christian community is responsible to its set of 
examples, not to theirs." 
In his rejoinder, however, Quinn indicates yet another difficulty with 
the way Plantinga proceeds in this matter. As he rightly points out, in his 
various writings on Reformed epistemology Plantinga does not, in fact, go 
about establishing epistemic criteria according to the prescribed method. 
In fact, one of the striking things about these writings is that Plantinga 
nowhere sets out necessary and sufficient conditions for a proposition to be 
properly basic. He does, to be sure, assert concerning specific propositions 
that in certain circumstances they could properly be accepted in a basic 
way, and concerning other propositions that in certain other circumstances 
they could not properly be so accepted. These examples, then, would form 
part of Plantinga's data set for establishing criteria for proper basicality. 
But he never proceeds to the actual work of constructing such criteria. 
Instead, he seems simply to assume that the Christian community, starting 
with theistic beliefs among its examples of properly basic beliefs, will be 
able to arrive at epistemic criteria which vindicate that initial judgment. 
And he appears willing to concede that the scientific naturalist, the 
Buddhist, and the follower of Rev. Moon may also be able to arrive at epis-
temic criteria which vindicate their distinctive beliefs as properly basic (or 
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as properly derived), and reject those of the Christian theist. 
Quinn points out that this assumption is premature and may well be 
unjustified. The crucial point to notice is that, under the procedure as spec-
ified, it need not be the case that the propositions eventually recognized as proper-
ly basic will coincide with the initial data set. This may be the case, but again it 
may not; the data set, as we have already noted, is in principle revisable 
under the pressure of theoretical considerations. Now, consider an enquir-
er who is initially undecided as to whether theistic beliefs can ever be 
properly basic. She will not, then, include such beliefs among either the 
positive or the negative examples of her original data set. On the basis of 
her data, she formulates a hypothesis about the sufficient conditions for 
proper basicality, and then she notices that certain theistic beliefs under 
certain conditions satisfy those conditions. She may, then, come to accept 
those theistic beliefs as properly basic, even though no such beliefs 
occurred in her initial data. 
But movement in the contrary direction is also possible. Someone begins 
with theistic beliefs as part of his data set of properly basic beliefs. Upon 
reflection, he formulates a set of necessary conditions for proper basicality 
which appear to account for the majority of his initial data set. It becomes 
apparent, however, that the theistic beliefs in his data set fail to satisfy 
those necessary conditions. Upon further reflection, he concludes that the 
theoretical considerations favoring the necessary conditions in question 
outweigh the intuitions supporting the inclusion of theistic beliefs in the 
data set, and as a result he no longer considers such beliefs as properly 
basic. 
The upshot, then, is that it is necessary actually to construct the criteria 
for proper basicality; it is not sufficient to specify a few examples and just 
assume that they will be preserved by the criteria that eventually emerge. 
It seems to me that Quinn is quite correct about this, and that Plantinga has 
been somewhat too cavalier in his treatment of this issue.7 Score: Quinn I, 
Plantinga O. 
II. The Status of Classical Foundationalism 
It is well known that Plantinga regards classical foundationalism as 
being self-referentially incoherent. Classical foundationalism, as he uses 
the term, is a disjunction of ancient and medieval foundationalism' with 
modern foundationalism. For purposes of this discussion, however, both 
Quinn and Plantinga focus on modern foundationalism, which holds that a 
belief is properly basic for a person only if the proposition believed is 
either self-evident or incorrigible for that person. Plantinga points out that 
this criterion is itself neither self-evident nor incorrigible, and in alllikeli-
hood cannot be derived by any acceptable method from propositions that 
are self-evident or incorrigible. If this is so, then the modern foundational-
ist who accepts the criterion is, by her own lights; irrational; thus the 
charge of self-referential incoherence. 
Quinn is unmoved by this. In his initial paper, he claims that Plantinga 
has failed to show that the criterion proposed by the modern classical 
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foundationalist is in any way defective. He admits, to be sure, that the 
modem foundationalist's criterion is not itself either self-evident or incorri-
gible. What needs to be further considered, however, is whether it might 
be possible to derive that criterion from propositions which are, by its own 
light, properly basic. Quinn suggests that this might be done using 
Plantinga's own procedure (discussed in the last section) for establishing 
epistemic criteria. That is to say: the modem foundationalist will assemble 
an initial data set consisting of pairs of beliefs and circumstances such that 
the beliefs in question either obviously are, or obviously are not, properly 
basic under the respective circumstances. Quinn further suggests that the 
modem foundationalist can plausibly claim that it is self-evident to her that 
these beliefs are (or are not) properly basic under the given circumstances. 
If this is so, and if the derivation of the criterion goes smoothly, the modem 
foundationalist can hold her criterion without any inconsistency or inco-
herence. As members of the initial data set, he suggests the following: 
(8) The belief that I am being appeared to redly is properly basic in 
conditions optimal for visual experience in which I am being 
appeared to redly. [Throughout the paper, the numbering of proposi-
tions follows that in Rejoinder.] 
And, 
(9) The belief that Jove is expressing disapproval is not properly basic 
in conditions optimal for auditory experience in which I am being 
appeared to thunderously. 
Both of these propositions, according to Quinn, may plausibly be regarded 
as self-evident by the modern foundationalist. Now of course, many more 
examples than this will be needed, and there is in addition the task of test-
ing the criterion against the data set. But all this means is that the modem 
foundationalist has work to do-the same conclusion we reached in the 
last section concerning the Reformed epistemologist. 
Plantinga finds all this extremely implausible. He does not claim to 
have shown conclusively that the modem foundationalist's project could not 
succeed, but the chances of this appear very slim. While he doubts that 
either of the data statements suggested by Quinn could be self-evident, he 
focuses especially on the negative example. The belief about Jove fails to 
be properly basic in case either (a) one is violating some epistemic duty in 
accepting it or (b) one's acceptance of it would involve some cognitive mal-
function. Plantinga points out that someone might be unable to refrain 
from accepting this belief under those conditions, and if so (on the "ought-
implies-can" principle) there can be no violation of duty in accepting it. 
And he insists that it could hardly be self-evident that acceptance of such a 
belief must involve some cognitive malfunction. In his rejoinder Quinn 
admits this, and suggests a reformulation: 
(10) The belief that Jove is expressing disapproval is not properly 
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basic in conditions optimal for auditory experience in which I am 
being appeared to thunderously and I can refrain from believing that 
Jove is expressing disapproval. 
This removes Plantinga's reason for saying that, in the original example, it 
might be impossible for one to violate epistemic duty by accepting the 
proposition. Quinn admits that Plantinga might be able to come up with 
some other objection to the claim that the example is self-evident; if that 
happens, the modern foundationalist will have to attempt yet another revi-
sion, and it can't be guaranteed that she will not succeed in this. What is 
clear is that the modern foundationalist has a great deal of work ahead of 
her. But then, as we saw in the last section, the same is true of the 
Reformed epistemologist. Quinn concludes, "Hence I am of the opinion 
that we thus far have no better reason for adopting criteria according to 
which some beliefs that self-evidently entail the existence of God can be 
properly basic than for adopting criteria according to which no such beliefs 
can be properly basic" (Rejoinder, p. 28). 
It seems to me that Quinn faces a steep uphill battle with this line of 
argument. Part of the problem is that Quinn is not a modern foundational-
ist, and he himself does not believe that his examples (especially the nega-
tive examples) really are self-evident. My own suspicion, anyway, is that 
each new formulation of a negative example can be met with still another 
objection, and the whole enterprise will have difficulty getting off the 
ground. Admittedly, the Reformed epistemologist also has a lot of work to 
do. But there is no reason to suppose that the same kind of problems will 
plague him, because there is no reason to think he will accept a criterion for 
proper basicality which is anywhere near as restrictive as that of the mod-
ern foundationalist. So Quinn's opinion that the two approaches are on a 
par, in the light of the Chisholm-Plantinga procedure for establishing epis-
temic criteria, is far from convincing. Score: Quinn I, Plantinga 1. 
III. Does Proper Basicality Mattcr? 
Is it important whether theistic beliefs are properly basic? Surprisingly, 
Quinn's answer to this is No. He writes, 
So, oddly enough, if certain propositions which self-evidently entail 
the existence of God can be properly basic for a person at a time, it is 
epistemically unimportant whether such propositions actually are 
properly basic for that person at that time. Without loss of degree of 
justification, such theistic propositions can just as well be properly 
based, at least in part, on others which are descriptive of the person's 
experience at the time and are then properly basic for the person. 
Although such theistic propositions would not need to be based on 
the evidence of other propositions, they always could be so based. So 
the cautious philosopher who did so base them would be every bit as 
justified in believing in the existence of God as the reckless mystic 
who did not (Scarch, p. 479). 
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What point is Quinn making here? What he says explicitly is that any 
belief which can be justified in a basic way can also be justified by evi-
dence, so that a person who justifies his belief in this way is at no epistemic 
disadvantage compared with someone who accepts the same belief as 
properly basic. I suspect, however, that Quinn means to suggest another, 
and stronger, conclusion. Note the last sentence, with its references to the 
"cautious philosopher" (i.e., the evidentialist), and the "reckless mystic" 
(i.e., the Reformed epistemologist). Doubtless the epithet is tongue-in-
cheek, but what point is being made? Well, consider the following argu-
ment: If evidentialism is correct and Reformed epistemology is wrong, 
then theistic beliefs are rational only if they can be justified by proposition-
al evidence (since in that case no other source of justification is available). 
If on the other hand Reformed epistemology is correct, it is still the case 
that theistic beliefs are rational only if they can be justified by propositional 
evidence (since whatever justification the beliefs receive directly from the 
experience, they could also receive from a propositional description of the 
experience). So, whether or not Reformed epistemology is correct, theistic 
beliefs are rational only if they can be justified by evidence. So it is epis-
temically unimportant whether or not Reformed epistemology is correct. 
I am not absolutely certain that this line of thought should be attributed 
to Quinn. But all the required premises are provided in the paragraph 
quoted abovt-'-and on the other hand, the argument is of sufficient interest 
in its own right to be worth pursuing, whether or not Quinn intended to 
suggest it. 
Let's examine Quinn's reasons for his claims. He bases his analysis in 
part on a parallel-in itself welcome to Reformed epistemologists like 
Plantinga-between theistic beliefs and ordinary perceptual beliefs. 
Suppose that, having a certain familiar type of experience, I form the belief 
that 
(13) I see a tree before me. 
Suppose, furthermore, that the belief formed in these conditions is proper-
ly basic. After reflecting upon my experience, I form an additional belief, 
namely 
(17) I am being appeared to treely. 
And now, Quinn says, 
Suppose further that I then proceed to change my noetic structure in 
such a way that (13) comes to be based on (17). And assume, finally, 
that there are no other changes in the conditions in which (13) was 
properly basic for me. Now (17) is properly basic for me .... But what 
of (13)? Though it is no longer basic for me, my claim is that it is now 
properly based on (17) and is no less justified for me than it was when 
it was properly basic for me ... Since, by hypothesis, my visual experi-
ence in those conditions suffices to confer a certain degree of justifica-
tion on the proposition expressed by (13), the amount of justification 
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that reaches the proposition expressed by (13) will not be less in those 
conditions if it passes by way of the proposition expressed by (17) 
than if it is transmitted directly without intermediary (Rejoinder, pp. 
29-30; the final sentence is quoted from Search, p. 478). 
By analogy, if the belief that God is speaking to me is properly basic in 
virtue of an experience I have while reading the Bible, then that belief will 
be no less justified if I formulate a propositional description of the experi-
ence and infer the belief that God is speaking to me from that description. 
A couple of points not made by Plantinga seem relevant here. First, it is 
not at all clear whether or how the kind of change envisioned by Quinn 
can actually come about. I frankly find it very difficult to envision how 
any normal human being could cause herself to suspend the practice of 
forming basic perceptual beliefs on the occasion of sensory experiences, 
and replace it with the practice of basing beliefs about her surroundings on 
descriptions of those experiences. (I can easily imagine someone claiming 
to have done this, on the basis of some epistemological theory she espous-
es-but that is a different matter altogether.)9 Second, it is evident that our 
experiences often have epistemically significant characteristics that we 
would find difficult or impossible to express in a description. Any actual 
experience of observing a tree, for example, is a great deal richer in content 
than the bare description afforded by (17). Now it may be that in the case 
of familiar kinds of experiences like seeing a tree, where we can assume 
that almost everyone has had relevantly similar experiences, the relative 
poverty of the description doesn't matter much epistemically. If on the 
other hand the experience is very unusual, or is for some reason controver-
sial, it can matter a great deal. Even if I believe implicitly everything St. 
Teresa says about her experience of the presence of Christ, it would be 
absurd to suppose that her description of that experience places me in an 
epistemic position comparable to hers as she first enjoys and then recollects 
her own experience. And this disparity between rich experiences and 
impoverished descriptions has an obvious bearing on the extent to which 
the justificatory force of an experience can be transmitted through a 
description of it. 1O 
Probably Plantinga would agree with these points, but the point he 
actually makes is a different one. (17), he says, does not constitute good 
evidence for (13). His principal reason for saying this is that a whole host 
of philosophers, from Descartes, Hume, and Reid down to the present, 
have demonstrated the failure of attempts to produce good arguments 
from propositions like (17) to propositions like (13); this is the (still 
unsolved) "problem of the external world." 
Quinn demurs from this; he insists that (17) is good evidence for (13), 
even if no one has been able to construct an argument to show that this is 
the case. Plantinga's reasoning here, he surmises, relies on the principle: 
(19) For all p and q, p is good evidence for q only if someone has con-
structed a cogent argument from p to q. 11 
But, says Quinn, this principle is false. For a counterexample, consider the 
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following: 
Suppose that, as I look out over my class, I observe a fidgety student. 
Upon noticing this, I form the following belief: 
(20) That student is moving restlessly about. 
I also form this belief: 
(21) That student feels uncomfortable. 
Now it is exceedingly hard to see how to construct a cogent argument 
from (20) to (21), as anyone who has studied Plantinga's God and Other 
Minds must admit. If the problem of other minds is as yet unsolved, as I 
think it is, no one has constructed such an argument. But (20) is good evi-
dence for (21), and so (19) is false (Rejoinder, p. 32). 
And by the same token, 
(22) It seems to me that God is speaking to me 
can be good evidence for 
(14) God is speaking to me, 
even if no one has constructed a good argument from (22) to (14). 
Now, Quinn and Plantinga agree that no one has constructed a good 
argument from (17) to (13), or from (20) to (21). What they have in mind, of 
course, is an argument that would be convincing to an epistemological sceptic. 
The problem of the external world and the problem of other minds, they 
agree, remain unsolved. On the other hand, someone who is not a sceptic 
about other minds would quite readily accept (20) as evidence for (21). But 
(20) would not be accepted as evidence for (21) by one who is a sceptic 
about other minds, or by someone seriously tempted to such scepticism. 
So it is really misleading to say, as Quinn does, that (20) is evidence for (21) 
even though there is no argument from (20) to (21). "Evidence" and "argu-
ment" are both context-relative, and the sceptic about other minds will not 
admit that we have either evidence or an argument here. For the non-scep-
tic, on the other hand, (20) is evidence for (21), but in that case it will not be 
difficult to construct an argument: we need only supply as an additional 
premise 
(20*) When a student moves restlessly about in class, that student 
usually is feeling uncomfortable. 
This premise, I suggest, could be confirmed to quite a satisfactory degree-
provided we are not sceptics about other minds. 
By the same token, if we are not religious sceptics we may accept (22) as 
evidence for (14), given appropriate further stipulations about the nature 
and conditions of the experience in question. (Even among the devout, 
claims that God has spoken to one are not taken to be as unproblematic as 
claims that one has seen a tree.) But in the context of the present discus-
sion, the entire point of talking about both evidence and arguments is the 
justification of theism in the face of religious scepticism. So what is the point, 
in such a context, of Quinn's appeal to "evidence" which will not be 
accepted as such by a religious sceptic? 
At this point we need to recall some generalities concerning the relation 
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between basic, non-inferential justification and justification by proposition-
al evidence. Basic justification typically comes about when a belief is 
formed and/ or sustained as a result of an appropriate kind of experience. 
This applies to beliefs about physical objects, beliefs about other minds, 
and (Plantinga has argued) to theistic beliefs as well. It is important to real-
ize that Quinn has not disputed any of this. That theistic beliefs can be non-
inferentially justified by experience is an assumption of this part of Quinn's 
argument, not something he is prepared to challenge. 
Now, what happens if, instead of relying on basic justification, we turn 
to justification by evidence, where the evidence consists of a description of 
the experience in question? What happens depends on who the evidence 
is offered to. If the person who assesses the evidence is a non-sceptic-that 
is, if she accepts that basic beliefs formed under those kinds of conditions 
are justified-then she will likely regard the evidence as good. Because of 
the relative poverty of the description in comparison with the actual expe-
rience, the justification by evidence will often be somewhat weaker than 
the basic justification, but in many contexts it may be strong enough to 
serve. If on the other hand the evidence is assessed by a sceptic, he will 
undoubtedly refuse, in the absence of a compelling argument, to acknowl-
edge that the alleged evidence has any force. 
To be sure, the sceptic will also refuse to accept the basic belief as justi-
fied, and experience suggests that it may be quite difficult to get him to 
change his mind. What is really at issue here, however, is the following 
question: How should one best proceed, within a foundationalist episte-
mology, in order to establish experience-based beliefs as justified? In 
answering this question, all the advantages lie on the side of taking the 
beliefs in question as properly basic. If we refuse to do this, the prospects 
for justifying either perceptual beliefs or beliefs about other minds inferen-
tially are distinctly unpromising, and inferential "arguments from religious 
experience" are conspicuously less impressive than is the case for taking 
theistic beliefs as properly basic. In the relevant kinds of cases, justification 
by evidence is parasitic on basic justification, and the parity Quinn claims 
between justification by evidence and direct, non-inferential justification by 
experience simply does not obtain. It does matter whether beliefs about 
God are properly basic. Score: Quinn 1, Plantinga 2. 
IV. The Case of the Intellectually Sophisticated Theist 
We now come to the area of disagreement between Quinn and 
Plantinga which, I believe, both of them regard as most important. It con-
cerns, on the one hand, the epistemic status of theistic belief for well-
informed contemporary theists, and, on the other hand, the importance or 
unimportance of natural theology. The discussion revolves around lithe 
intellectually sophisticated adult theist in our culture," a person Quinn 
supposes to "know a good deal about standard objections to belief in God . 
. . [including] various versions of the problem of evil as well as the tradi-
tion of explaining theistic belief projectively that stems from Feuerbach and 
comes down to us through Freud and Durkheim" (Rejoinder, p. 35). (Later 
on I shall suggest a modification of this description.) 
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Granted that theistic beliefs can be basic under the appropriate circum-
stances, are they in fact basic for typical, well-informed theists in our cul-
ture? Plantinga thinks they are, but Quinn thinks they are not. Quinn is not 
denying that such theists have experiences which confer non-inferential jus-
tification on their beliefs. But he thinks that, in the typical case, this non-
inferential justification will be outweighed by the kinds of objections to the-
ism that are so prevalent in contemporary intellectual culture. So if these 
theists are to be rational in their beliefs, the non-inferential justification of 
the beliefs through experience needs to be supplemented by a broad case 
for the rationality of theistic belief-that is, by natural theology. On this 
point, Plantinga says, "I find myself in solid disagreement" (Reply, p. 308). 
Pretty clearly, Quinn and Plantinga disagree about the strength of the 
justification most theists possess in virtue of their religious experience. 
Quinn thinks that for the typical theist, who has not been spoken to from a 
burning bush but who (for example) senses God speaking to him as he 
reads the Bible, these beliefs "have only a modest amount of [non-inferen-
tial] warrant" (Rejoinder, p. 40). I think Plantinga believes the warrant is 
stronger than this, though he says little about this directly. Both men 
devote most of their discussion to the potential defeaters of theistic belief, 
and we shall follow their example. 
Concerning the problem of evil, Quinn writes, "What I know, partly 
from experience and partly from testimony, about the amount and variety 
of non-moral evil in the universe confirms highly for me the proposition 
expressed by ... 
(28) God does not exist" (Rejoinder, p. 40). 
Quinn adds that this claim of his is consistent with (28) being highly dis-
confirmed by his total evidence. But clearly, additional evidence is needed, 
to overcome the strong objection to theism based on natural evil. 
Plantinga concedes that the problem of evil initially seems to present a 
strong reason for rejecting theism, but he thinks this initial impression is 
misleading. He notes that atheologians have pretty well given up the 
claim that evil is logically inconsistent with theism, and have retreated to 
the claim that theism is improbable with respect to the evidence of evil. In 
response to this, Plantinga observes that "no atheologian has given a suc-
cessful or cogent way of working out or developing a probabilistic atheo-
logical argument from evil, and I believe there are good reasons for think-
ing it can't be done" (Reply, p. 309). (He refers the reader interested in 
these reasons to his own article on the subject.12) Quinn replies that the fail-
ure to construct a successful probabilistic argument from evil shows that 
evil does not disconfirm theism only if we assume that confirmation must 
be understood probabilistically, an assumption Quinn rejects. He writes, "I 
take intuitively clear cases of scientific confirmation and disconfirmation as 
data against which philosophical accounts of confirmation are to be tested . 
. . . And I am inclined to think that the claim [that] (28) is highly confirmed 
by the non-moral evil in the universe is another such datum for confirma-
tion theory" (Rejoinder, p. 41). 
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I suspect that quite a few theists will fail to be satisfied by Plantinga's 
approach to this problem. There is the initial difficulty that understanding 
Plantinga's objections to probabilistic arguments from evil requires a level 
of logical sophistication which is not possessed by all philosophers, let 
alone non-philosophers. But even for those who understand his argu-
ments (or accept the assurance of experts that the arguments are success-
ful), there remains the larger challenge exemplified by Quinn's response to 
Plantinga. To Quinn it seems simply evident that the world's evil discon-
firms theism, and the failure of a particular philosophical strategy for 
showing this (e.g., by arguments based on probability theory) leaves that 
troubling conviction unaffected. If one sees the problem of evil primarily 
as a group of arguments devised by atheistic philosophers to make life dif-
ficult for theists, then showing that, for technical reasons, these arguments 
are unsuccessful may be a sufficient response. (Showing this is in any case 
an important thing to do, and Plantinga has done it brilliantly.) But if one 
is deeply troubled and perplexed by the actual phenomena of evil, a purely 
negative and defensive strategy may be insufficient. What one needs, in 
that case, is some positive account of evil, something that offers some actu-
al understanding of why evil exists and how it fits into God's plan for the 
world. In other words, a theodicy.13 
The disagreement between Quinn and Plantinga about projective expla-
nations of religious belief is sharp. Plantinga writes, "Freud's jejune specu-
lations as to the psychological origin of religion and Marx's careless claims 
about its social role can't sensibly be taken as providing argwnent or rea-
son for (28), i.e., for the nonexistence of God; so taken they present text-
book cases ... of the genetic fallacy" (Reply, p. 308). Quinn admits there are 
flaws in Freud's writings on this topic, but insists that lito construe Freud's 
contribution to our understanding of religion as nothing but jejune specu-
lation strikes me as uncharitable in the extreme." He goes on to discuss 
various projection theories, and concludes "I believe that projection theo-
ries have so far achieved a real, but limited, success in explaining religious 
beliefs of some sorts, and I think this success does give the intellectually 
sophisticated adult theist in our culture substantial reason for thinking that 
(28) is true" (Rejoinder, pp. 41, 42). 
Plantinga thinks the projection theories (considered as an argument for 
God's non-existence) commit the genetic fallacy, because they assume that 
an account of the origin of religious belief is determinative for its subse-
quent status, in this case its truth or falsity. This assessment may be cor-
rect.].! But what Plantinga overlooks is that psychological projection theo-
ries, if they are successful, constitute a powerful undercutting defeater for 
the claim that theistic beliefs are non-inferentially justified by religious 
experience. The view that such experiences do provide significant non-
inferential justification for theistic beliefs is plausible only on the supposi-
tion that, in the experience, the believer is genuinely in contact with God. I 
don't mean by this that one must first establish that there is contact with 
God, and only then conclude that the experiences afford justification; that 
would be falling back into the trap of evidential ism. But evidence that the 
experience can be completely and correctly explained without reference to 
the presence and activity of God strongly undermines the claim of those 
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experiences to afford justification for beliefs about God's character and 
activities.1s And this kind of explanation is just what the projection theories 
claim to provide. Furthermore, it's not necessary, in order to have this 
effect, for the projection theories to show that all religious experience is a 
result of projection. The non-inferential justification of religious beliefs by 
experience is largely, if not entirely, a "first-person" affair, and if one 
comes to suspect that one's own religious experiences are the result of psy-
chological projection, wish-fulfillment, and the like, then that tends to both 
to discredit the experiences themselves and to undermine any warrant 
they might otherwise provide for one's religious beliefs.!6 
That is not to say that the projection theories are in fact successful in dis-
crediting religious experience and religious beliefs. This is a large topic, and 
no doubt there is much to be said against such theories, especially when 
they are taken as a general explanation for religious belief and practice. But 
there is work here that needs to be done, and once a person has begun to 
recognize the elements of plausibility, and indeed of partial truth, in these 
theories, an offhand dismissal like Plantinga's is not apt to be convincing.!7 
At this point I wish to suggest a modest addition to Quinn's description 
of the intellectually sophisticated adult theist in our culture. I believe the 
addition will be both realistic, in that many contemporary theists in fact 
conform to the augmented description, and helpful for the present topic. I 
will ask us to assume that our typical theist has a modicum of knowledge 
about the plurality of religions in the modern world. In particular, she 
knows that there are several different "world religions" with mutually 
incompatible doctrines, each of them boasting elaborate, intellectually 
developed systems of belief and espoused by intelligent, thoughtful advo-
cates who can testify to experiences confirmatory of their respective beliefs.!' 
Now, how does this affect the rationality of our theist's belief in God? It 
does not necessarily lend support to atheism; indeed one might seek to 
argue from the prevalence of religious experience that there is "something 
out there" to which the religious are responding. It seems clear, however, 
that religious pluralism does to some extent weaken the support, whether 
inferential or non-inferential, of religious experience for any particular sys-
tem of beliefs about the nature of God or ultimate reality. This does not, I 
think, mean that the theist ought to give up her beliefs; they are, after all, her 
beliefs, grounded in part in her own experience, and she should give them 
up only if, after thorough reflection, they seem insufficiently likely to be 
true, or to be close to the truth in important respects. But the fact that oth-
ers-Buddhists and Hindu advaitists, for example-experience the divine 
as having significantly different characteristics has to constitute a problem 
for her. And it is exceedingly difficult to see how she is going to find a sat-
isfying resolution of the problem apart from a large-scale apologetic enter-
prise which will argue for the superiority of theism as a worldview and, 
indeed, for the particular variety of theism she espouses. 19 
What shall we conclude from all this? I think we have seen that each of 
the three problem areas we have considered may well present genuine dif-
ficulty for well-informed contemporary theists, and the resolution of these 
difficulties is likely to demand answers going well beyond the kinds of 
responses Plantinga has indicated. Are the difficulties so severe as to over-
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whelm the non-inferential justification the theist has for her belief in God, 
and render that belief no longer properly basic for her? That is a difficult 
question to answer, and in fact no general answer is possible; the answer in 
each case will depend both on the strength of the theist's non-inferential 
justification for her belief, and on the strength for her of the various objec-
tions to it. But even if her non-inferential justification for theism is suffi-
cient to outweigh the combined force of the objections, the latter is great 
enough that sooner or later it is going to take its toll, creating genuine dis-
comfort and perplexity. It seems, then, that it will be to her advantage, 
even if it is not absolutely essential for justified belief, to have available to 
her further answers which defeat the objections and contribute to an over-
all case for the rationality of theistic belief. 
Now in principle, these further answers could be limited to "defeater-
defeaters"; they could consist of considerations which lessen or eliminate 
the force of the objections to theism, but do not attempt to provide any pos-
itive support for belief in the existence of God or for a particular system of 
religious belief. But while the further support could be so limited, is there 
any intelligible reason why it ought to be? Should the theist not, on the 
contrary, avail herself of plausible theistic arguments, if there are any, and 
permit them to add their force to her "cumulative case" for the reality of 
God and the truthfulness of her faith? If not, why not? To be sure, if the 
various objections could be defeated conclusively and without remainder, 
it may be the theist would find it superfluous to attempt to add anything 
by way of positive argumentative support; in her reclaimed innocence, she 
could again assume the stance of the "rational basic believer." In practice, 
though, that is not how things are likely to go. All of the objections we 
have mentioned, even when answered as completely as possible, are likely 
to leave behind a lingering aura of tension not fully resolved. And unless 
we, like Kierkegaard, revel in intellectual uncertainty as the lifeblood of 
faith, it is only sensible to marshal all our resources in order to exhibit to 
the greatest degree possible the rational excellence of the faith we profess.20 
So who wins the debate? Obviously the issues in this part of the paper 
are many and complex, and it would be rash in the extreme to assert that 
either Quinn or Plantinga (or the author of this paper!) is right about all of 
them. But on the main points at issue, the seriousness of the challenges to 
theism and the importance of natural theology, I cannot help but conclude 
that Quinn is more nearly right than Plantinga. Final Score: Quinn 2, 
Plantinga 2. 
In the end of course, it is artificial and perhaps even wrong-headed to 
think of "scoring" a debate like this one. Insofar as issues are clarified and 
light is thrown on them, both Quinn and Plantinga are winners-as are all 
the rest of us who have benefited from their exchange. And if the general 
conclusions drawn in this final section are correct, there is another sense in 
which the debate has many winners and no losers. We have envisioned a 
situation in which there is a large number of philosophical and apologetic 
tasks waiting to be performed. Much work remains to be done in clarify-
ing the nature, scope and force of the non-inferential justification of reli-
gious belief by experience. There is also the task of traditional natural the-
ology, in developing and advancing arguments and analyses supportive of 
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belief in God and the religious worldview.21 Insofar as our faith is crucially 
rooted in historical narratives, there is philosophical work (as well as his-
torical work) to be done in clarifying the nature, credibility, and evidential 
force of those narratives. And of course, there is a great deal that needs to 
be said in response to the many potential defeaters of religious belief. 
There is occupation here for virtually every philosophical taste and tal-
ent-and what more could a philosopher ask for?22 But all this work needs 
to be done-we intellectually sophisticated contemporary adult theists 
need all the help we can gee' 
Huntington College 
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3. Linda Zagzebski, ed., Rational Faith: Catholic Responses to Reformed 
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tion is from p. 76. 
5. "The sample set, furthermore, should be revisable in the light of the-
ory and under the pressure of argument. Thus we may come to see that a 
pair <BC>, originally taken to be an example of belief and a circumstance 
such that the former is justified in the latter, is really not of that sort" 
("Reason and Belief in God," p. 76). 
6. "Reason and Belief in God," p.60. 
7. William Alston finds it strange that I award a point to Quinn for his 
objection, since Plantinga has acknowledged that some beliefs initially 
accepted as properly basic may later be denied that status. Alston quotes 
Quinn's assertions that "it should not be taken for granted that once the 
Reformed Epistemologist ... puts the particularistic method to work, he is 
bound to succeed in justifying criteria for proper basicality according to 
which theistic beliefs are properly basic" (Rejoinder, p. 21). He then adds, 
"presumably Plantinga would not disagree." (Comments delivered at the 
Society for Philosophy of Religion, March 6, 1997.) It seems to me, however, 
after re-reading the relevant sections of "Reason and Belief-in God," that 
Plantinga does take this for granted: it is something that is essential for his 
position, but he never defends it or even indicates awareness of the need for 
a defense. He does seem simply to assume that, once the Christian commu-
nity has been allowed its own set of epistemic examples, the result will be 
vindication of belief in God as properly basic. 
Plantinga does address the task of formulating epistemic criteria in his 
book, Warrant and Proper Function (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1993). But a shift of epistemological paradigms has occurred in the mean-
time, from deontolgocial justification to warrant conceived externalistically, 
and it remains somewhat unclear how this new material is to be related to 
the earlier work on Reformed epistemology. Presumably these matters will 
be clarified in Plantinga's forthcoming book, Warranted Christian Belief. 
8. According to ancient and medieval foundationalism, a belief is prop-
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erly basic if it is either self-evident or evident to the senses. 
9. It may be that there are cases in which one can decide either to accept 
a belief in a basic way or to accept it on the basis of propositional evidence. 
But ordinary perceptual beliefs like (13) do not seem to be good candidates. 
10. William Wainwright has suggested, in conversation, that the eviden-
tial force of description may be high for the person who had the experience, even 
if it is lower for someone else. It does not seem to me, however, that the rela-
tion of evidential support between two propositions can vary in this way. (It 
can vary due to differences in background information, but simply having 
had the experience will not by itself put the experiencer in possession of 
additional background information.) My proposal is rather that the addi-
tional warrant enjoyed by the experiencer derives, not from the proposition-
al description of the experience, but rather from her recollection of the expe-
rience itself, with the proposition serving as a reminder. So interpreted, the 
case does not constitute a counterexample to my generalization. 
11. I believe Quinn is being somewhat unfair to Plantinga here, though 
no doubt unintentionally so. I suggest we should rather understand 
Plantinga as holding the more plausible principle 
(19*) For all p and q, p is good evidence for q only if it is possible 
for someone to construct a cogent argument from p to q. 
And Plantinga may very well suppose that, given that many acute 
philosophers have tried strenuously to find a cogent answer to the problem 
of the external world and have failed to do so, it is likely that the construc-
tion of such an argument is impossible. 
12. See, "The Probabilistic Argument from Evil," Philosophical Studies 
1980, pp. ]-53. 
13. I believe Plantinga is troubled and perplexed by the phenomena of 
evil, but his sense of the greatness of God and the insufficiency of human 
reason makes him despair of our ability to provide much in the way of con-
structive understanding of it. If so, this is a classically Reformed response-
and as such, it will be appealing to some contemporary theists, but certainly 
not to all. 
14. It may be, however, that Marx, Freud, and other projection theorists 
were not actually committing this fallacy. Rather they may have concluded 
on evidentialist grounds that God does not exist. 
15. It will not be sufficient for the theist to claim in the connection that, 
since God's sustaining activity is required for the existence of all objects, 
persons, and events, no experience can be explained "without reference to 
the presence and activity of God." In order to claim that the experiences con-
fer justification, the theist must hold that involved in those experiences in a 
direct and specific way. 
16. My own mother, an extremely devout person, once mentioned to me 
that, when she first learned of the psychological explanations of religion, she 
was unable to pray for several months. I suspect that, for many contempo-
rary theists, the thought that one's own religious affections may be the pro-
jections of psychological needs is a sort of lingering undercurrent of the reli-
gious life. 
17. J have learned from Alvin Plantinga that his forthcoming book, 
Warranted Christian Belief, will contain an extensive discussion of projection 
theories. 
18. In correspondence, Quinn states, "J agree completely that the intel-
lectually sophisticated theist will need to deal with the problem of religious 
diversity or pluralism. My thoughts on this topic are contained in my 
'Towards Thinner Theologies: Hick and Alston on Religious Diversity' 
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(International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 38 [1995], pp. 145-64)." 
19. This point has been made by a number of authors. Consider, e.g., 
William Hasker, "On Justifying the Christian Practice," The New 
Scholasticism 60 (1986), pp. 129-44; David Basinger, "Hick's Religious 
Pluralism and 'Reformed Epistemology': A Middle Ground," Faith and 
Philosophy 5:5 (1988), pp. 421-432; and William Wainwright, "Religious 
Language, Religious Experience, and Religious Pluralism," in Thomas D. 
Senor, ed., The Rationality of Belief and the Plurality of Faith: Essays in Honor of 
William P. Alston (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 170-88. Alston 
now agrees that it is advisable to use all available means, including meta-
physical and historical arguments, to resolve the ambiguity created by the 
plurality of mystical practices; see his Perceiving God (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1991), chapter 7. Plantinga, so far as I am aware, has not 
yet addressed the issue. 
20. It would be premature to claim that there is a consensus on this 
point, but I believe it is possible to discern a movement in the direction of 
such a consensus. In addition to the sources cited in the previous note, sev-
eral of the essays in Rational Faith call for such a broad-based apologetic 
strategy, one which includes the non-inferential justification of belief by 
experience as well as metaphysical and historical argument and responses to 
the various potential defeaters of religious belief. Even Plantinga has soft-
ened in his attitude towards natural theology; he has delivered (but not so 
far published) a paper entitled "Two Dozen (Or So) Arguments for the 
Existence of God." 
21. It will, of course, be important to refrain from the excessive claims to 
demonstrative certainty characteristic of much traditional natural theolo-
gy-claims which provide all to easy a target for critics of theism. 
22. Even the atheists gain by this; they will have more and better grist for 
their mills than ever before! 
23. I wish to acknowledge helpful comments on earlier versions of this 
essay from William Alston, David Basinger, Alvin Plantinga, Philip Quinn, 
and William Wainwright. 
